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lN THE SUPREME COURT
1

of the

STATE OF UTAH
DUKA L ..JOHNSON, on behalf of
lwrsell' and all other taxpayers of the
Statt' of Utah,

Plaintiff and Re::;pondcnt,
-vs.-

STATI~

U'rAH,

Case No. 10555

TAX COMMISSION OF
Dcfeudant and Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

rrhis is an action for declaratory judgment wherein
appdlant seeks to reform part of the judgment of the
lower Court and affirm the remainder thereof. The
is:me in controversy is ~when certain income tax rate
increases become effective.

DISPOSITION OF THE GASJ£ BY LO\VER COURT
\Vith respect to the rights of the parties under H.B.
No. 81, or what is now 59-14-2, U.C.A., 1953, the lower
Conrt granted rt'8J>OndE>nt's motion for summary judgnwnt in the following terms:
1. 11 here is no genuint> issue as to any ma-

terial fact alleged in the complaint.
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2. That the income tax rates providPd in
H.B. 81 ( 3Gth Legislature) do not av ply
to the plaintiff Dona L. Johnson nor to
other Utah income taxpayers ~who filPd an
income tax return on or before Dt'ct•mbt'l'
31, 1965.
3. That
ture)
well
H.B.
Utah

Section 5 of H.B. 81 ( 36th Legislais not ambiguous and H.B. 81 as
as the statutes implementing said
81 do not violate provisions of th<' '
or Federal Constitutions.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant's appeal from that portion of the lower
Court's judgment determining that the respondent and
others filing 1965 income tax returns before January 1,
1966, are entitled to pay tax at the rate8 existing prior
to the enactment of H.B. No. 81.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent is a calendar year taxpayer who
earned income in the year 1965. This income is taxable by
the State of Utah.
The 1965 Utah Legislature passed an individual income tax law \vhich in its final form was kn01\'n as H.B.
No. 81.
In an attempt to avoid the higher tax rates imposed
by H.B. No. 81, Plaintiff and approximately 6,000 other
citizens of this State filed 1965 calendar year income tax
returns with the State Tax Commission before January
1, 1966.

rrhe 1'ax Co1111nission has adopted the position that
tlw rate irn:n~ases apply to income for all taxable yearn
commencing on or after January 1, 1965.
The respondent on the other hand contends that the
rate increases established by H.B. No. 81 do not effectively apply to returns filed before January 1, 1966, for
1965 calendar year income.
ln addition the Tax Commission ha::; allowed fiscal
year taxpayers with fiscal year8 ending in 1965 to pay
at previously existing rates. In certain isolated instances
the Commission has also allowed calendar year taxpayers
to make returns before January 1, 1966, based on the
prior rates. In the latter case, such returns were accepted
subject to audit and possible judicial review.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE 1965 UTAH LEGISLATURE INTENDED THAT
THE INCOME TAX RATE INCREASE IMPOSED BY H.B.
NO. 81 SHOULD APPLY TO THE NET INCOME OF A
CALENDAR YEAR TAXPAYER EARNED DURING 1965.

The lower Court has held that most 1965 calendar
year taxpayers must pay the new or higher rates of
tax on their 1965 income. At the same time, it has held
that those 1965 calendar year taxpayers who filed returns
before January 1, 1966, need not pay such rates.
In other words, the Court has said that H.B. No.
81 is effective to impose a tax on all calendar or fiscal
·' ('UX incomes after January l, 1965, if such taxpayer8
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don't file before ,January 1, 1966. However the Court
then says that H.B. No. 81 is eff('etive J anuarv.J 1' 19GG '
as far as 1965 calendar year income taxpayers are concerned, providing such taxpayers file their returns before that time.
0

The net result of the Court's decision is that a f e\\taxpayers are allowed to determine whether or not they
want to be subject to the rate increases, but tens of thom;ands of others, who could not prepare and file returns
or ascertain income before January 1, 1966, have no
choice in whether or not they will pay at the new rates.
Appellant cannot conceive that any court could attribute such an intention to the legislature or give such
an interpretation to the statute.
'The statute does not say that taxpayers filing returns before January 1, 1966, are not required to pay
the higher rate. It does not say that by filing early, if in
fact this can be done, they can or must pay the lower rate.
Judge Ellett in the case of Allan E. M echarn, et al
v. State Tax Comniission, No. 10410, now pending before
this Court, ruled that the statute was clear and that the
legislature intended the rate increases to apply to calendar and fiscal year incomes earned after .T anuary l,
1965. If this is true, then appellant cannot comprehend
how the lower Court in this case can have held that for
early filers the rate increase only apply to 1966 calendar
year income.
It is the net income in a calendar year which is taxed
under the laws of this State. The presence or absencP
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of a return has never been deemed significant in determining the rate of tax which would be applicable to a
particular year's net income. Appellant might ask, what
if a taxpayer filed no return at all for the calendar year~
Would the respondent say that the new rates would not be
applicable because no return ~was filed? Under Section
5 of H.B. No. 81 as inteqJreted by respondent and upheld
lJy the lower Court, the new rate would not apply until
a return was filed. 8uch a premium placed on filing the
return might open the door to tax evasion such as this
~tate has never seen.
Appellant submits that the legislature clearly did
not intend such a result. Legislative intent in this regard
iti evidenced from the statute itself. Chapter 125, Laws
of Utah, 1965, which was enacted by the 1965 Utah Legislature as H.B. No. 81, provides in part:
"There shall be levied, collected and paid for
each taxable year upon the net income of every
resident of the State, a tax equal to the sum of
the following :
Here the Legislature inserted the rate increases as
established for various income categories. Then the
statute continues :
"The tax rates provided for herein shall apply to all returns filed on or after J anaury 1,
1966, for taxable years commencing on or after
.January 1, 1965."
A taxable year is defined by Section 59-14-1 U.C.A.
1%3, as follows:

6

"The term 'taxable year' mean:::; the calendar
year, or the fiscal year ending during ::-;ud1 calender year upon the basis of which the net income is computed under this chapter. 'Taxabk
year' includes, in the case of a return made for a
fractional part of a year under the provisions
of this chapter, or under regulations prescribed
by the tax commission, the period for which such
return is made. 'Fiscal year' means an accounting
period of twelve months, ending on the last day
of any month other than December."
It appears clear that the Legislature intended, at
the very least, to impose increased income tax rates on the
net incomes of Utah residents earned during calendar or
fiscal years commencing after January 1, 19G5.
In other words, the incidence of the Utah income
tax is a taxable year's income and the legislature determined that returns filed to report income earned during
taxable years commencing on or after January 1, 19G5,
would be taxable at the new rates. It expressly stated
that these rates would apply to all returns filed on or
after January 1, 1966, for such taxable years.
However, it is contended by the taxpayer m this
case that an income tax return filed prior to January
1, 1966, can avoid the increased rate of income tax even
though the legislature has expressly determined that her
1965 calendar year income should be taxed at increased
rates.
This contention is based upon a narrow and limited
reading of Section 5 creating a negative inference that
returns filed prior to January 1, 19GG, c1ualify for the old
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rnt<'. The taxpayer jnteqmc'ts the statute in question to
sa~· that only return::-; filed after January 1, 1966, are
subject to the new rates.
'l1hi:s inference is unfounded. It is income that is
:subject to tax, not returns. lf the legislature has clearly
deten11ined that all HJG5 calendar year income is to be
wb,jected to increa:sed tax rate::-; then the Court cannot
negate that intention by relying on a negative inference
arising from au i8olated portion of the statute.
l LB. No. 81, is explicit in stating that taxpayer income for each taxable year is to be taxed at the new
rate8 establi8hed by that statute. The new rates became
effective in 1965 and under Section 59-14-1, U.C.A., 1953,
apply to the taxable, i.e. calendar year, income of that
year.

Section 59-14-19 provides in part:
"Payment of Tax. "When Due.
" ( 1) Except as provided in Section 59-14-37
( 2), the total amount of tax imposed by this
chapter shall be paid on the 15th day of April
following the close of the calender year, or if the
return should be made on the basis of a fiscal
year, then on the 15th day of the fourth month
following the close of the fiscal year.
8ection 5 of H.B. Ko. 81 itself provides support for
the proposition that the legislature intended that the
rate increase apply to income for all taxable years start1nµ; on or after .January l, 1965. It is suggested that the

8
controversial language of this :Section was only intended
to provide guide lines for fiscal year taxpayers and to
establish that all fiscal year taxpayers filing on or after
January 1, 1966, should pay the new rates.
It is submitted that the plain and obvious intent
of the 1965 legislature was to impose increased rates of
income taxation on all yearly income earned after January 1, 1965, by either fiscal year or calendar year taxpayers.
It is also submitted that the legislature did in fact
determine such income should be taxed at increased rates
after January 1, 1965, for calendar year taxpayers and
at increased rates for all fiscal years beginning after
January 1, 1965. If this is true, then the date of filing
returns for 1965 calendar year income cannot determine
the rate of tax applicable to such income.
POINT II
A CALENDAR YEAR TAXPAYER CANNOT FILE A
LEGAL INCOME TAX RETURN PRIOR TO THE END OF
THE CALENDAR YEAR IN WHICH INCOME IS EARNED
WITHOUT CHANGING HIS ACCOUNTING PERIOD.

Section 59-14-17, U.C.A., 1953, provides in part:
"Returns shall be made to the state tax commission on or before the 15th day of April in each
year, if the return is made on the basis of the
calendar year, or if the return is made on the
basis of the fiscal year, then ~within three rnontl1~
and fifteen days following the close of the fiscal
year . . . "
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It i8 8Ubmitted that thi8 8tatute contemplates the
filing of returns only after the close of the calendar or
fiscal year for which they are required to be filed. In
the case of fi8C'.al year returns this requirement is explicit. Calendar year returns Ly necessary implication
(•.an only be filed after the clo8e of the calendar year.

rrhe tax commis8ion'8 po8ition in this regard is fully
:supported by Section 59-1-1-17, U.C.A., 1953. It is required therein that returns ba8ed on calendar year income "8hall be made ... on or before the 15th day of
April of each year . . . " (Emphasis Added). A return
filed in December, 1965, for the calendar year 1965 would
not satisfy this requirement in that it would not be made
in the same year as the April 15 filing deadline.
The question is often asked if a taxpayer having
completed his income transactions prior to the end of
a calendar year cannot then file a return for such income
if it is completely ascertainable.
The statutes make special provision for short period
returns or for taxpayers who desire to change from a
calendar to a fiscal year basis. Section 59-14-14 provides:

"If a taxpayer changes his accounting period
from fiscal year to calendar year, from calendar
year to fiscal year, or from one fiscal year to
another, the net income shall, with the approval
of the tax commission, be computed on the basis of
such new accounting period, subject to the provisions of Section 59-14-15."
8ections 59-14-1 ( 4 ), 59-14-12 and 59-14-15, U.C.A.,
1!l:-i:~. al:-;o establi8h rules for filing 8hort period or
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fractional yt•ar returns and for t>stahlislting or dianging
accounting veriods. In eaeh ease any d<>parture from a
calPndar yPar filing is conclitiorn d upon obtaining the
approval of the tax commission and the (•xistenc(~ of a
valid reason for cutting short the taxpayer's ealendar
year.
1

No such reason exisb in the present case. -Without a
valid reason and without the prior approval of the tax
commission, returns submitted to the commission before
the end of the taxpayer's cal(•ndar year are not properly
filed and are subject to a deficiency assessment after
April 15 in that year if improperly paid or computed.
Legislative intention in this regard is clear both
from the plain meaning of the statute governing filing
and from a reading of the tintire act. 8ection 5 of H.B.
No. 81 does not purport to determine this question. rro
allow such a determination by negative inference is to
disregard specific statutory language as well as long
established practices, thereby thwarting legislative intention. This the Court should not do.
POINT III
IT IS CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE TO IMPOSE
DIFFERENT INCOME TAX RATES ON CALENDAR YEAR
TAXPAYERS THAN ON FISCAL YEAR TAXPAYERS.

lt is a familiar fact that income tax rates tend to
vary from one year to another. 'J1he qrn•stion of when
such rate ehanges are to b(~ put into pffect is Olll' for tlte
Legi::.:;lature. The problem is cornplieated beeause sn('li
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unrnt eoincid<· with the legal incidence of the tax.
Language uf a provision inereasing a tax rate which did
not eorrespond with other prnvisions establishing the
taxabl<' period \rould rn·('.es::-;arily be meaningless.

<·li~rng-<·s

rrlte proeedure adopted by the Utah Legislature,
upon enacting H.B. .Ko. 81 was to impose increased tax
rates on i1wome Parned during taxable years commencing 011 ur after January 1, 1965.
The ef feet of Jf.B. No. 81 is to require all calendar
year taxpayers to pay the increased rates after January
1, l9G5. However, the increased rates are only imposed
on fiseal year taxpayers as their fiscal years commence
some time in 1965. Thus most of the income earned by a
taxpayer on a N overnber, 1964:, to November, 1965, year,
would be taxed at the rates in existence prior to the enactment of H.B. No. 81. At the same time all of the 1965
inc01ne earned by a calendar year taxpayer would be
taxed at the re\v rates 1 according to the interpretation
given to H.B. No. 81 by the State 'Tax Commission.

It is contended by the taxpayer that it is unconstitutional to impose the increased rates upon her and at
the same time allmv fiscal year taxpayers to report part
of their 1965 income at lower rates.
The taxpayer's vrotest in this regard overlooks the
very natun' of the tax. The Utah tax is on the net income of every resident of this State ditring each taxable
year. See 59-14:-2, U.C.A., 1953.
:Viscal yt>ar taxpayers have no taxable income until
th<· dost> of their taxable year. This period, for fiscal
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year taxpayers al-way:::; falls into varyrng parts of hru
calendar years.
The taxpayer apparently conknds that either thc
legislature cannot raise income tax rates or that it must
tax all income earned after January 1, 19G5, at the ne\r
rates to both calendar and fiscal year taxpayers alike.
Either result is chaotic.

1

The first is contrary to practice which is both historically established and judicially approved. The legislature does have the right to change tax rates as the
public welfare may require. Knights v. Treasurer & Beceiver General, 237 Mass. 493, 130 N.E. 60, affirmed, 360
U.S. 12, 43 S. Ct., 67 L. Ed. 192.
The alternative result of the taxpayer's argument
has the effect of taxing fiscal year taxpayers on calendar year receipts whether or not such receipts ultimately
result in income
While the legislature could have required fiscal year
taxpayers to pro-rate their tax based upon the portion of
taxable inL'.ome earned in each of tvrn different calendar
years, its failure to do so cannot make the act untonstitutional. In order to establish a pro-ration of tax so as to
promote absolute equality, it would have been neces:::;ary
to impose a complicated and intricate formula upon
fiscal year taxpayers. An example of such a formula
is the following, used by the Federal Government in recent years:
Section 21 (a) IRC, 1954, provide:::; in part:
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lf any rate of tax im~wsed by this chapter
changes, and if the taxable year includes the efl'ecti ve date of the change (unless that date is the
first day of the taxable year), then ...

" (1) tentative taxes shall be computed by
applying the rate for the period before the effec~
tive date of the change, and the rate for the period
on and after such date, to the taxable income for
the entire taxable year; and
'' ( 2) the tax for such taxable year shall be
the sum of that proportion of each tentative tax
which the number of days in each period bears
to the number of days in the entire taxable
year. . . . "

But there is no requirement of absolute equality or
uniformity in income taxation. As long as a discrimination is not arbitrary or capricious, it does not fall within
a constitutional prohibition. Lawrence v. State Tax Commission, 286 U.S. 276, 52 S. Ct. 556, 76 L.Ed. 1102 !
W clch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 59 S.Ct. 121, 83 L. Ed. 87.
The Federal Government and may of the states have
enacted statutes for all practical purposes indentical with
H.B. No. 81 or Chapter 25, Laws of Utah, 1965. In these
cases fiscal year taxpayers have been accorded the same
treatment as that established by the 1965 Utah LegislahHe in the interests of order and simplification of filing
requirements.
rrhe Revenue Act of 1932 provided in Section 1:
'' ( 1) The provisions of this title shall apply
onlv
. to the taxable year
. 1932 and succeeding taxable years ... "
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Section 1-1 of the same act established a pro-ration
formula for computing the tax where the fiscal year
period embraced years with different tax lmrn. Similar
provisions were found in some previous Revenue Acts.
However in 193-1, Revenue Act 1934, 26 U.S.iC.A. ~1 1
the treatment of fiscal year taxpayers was changed. That
act provided :
"The provisions of this title shall apply only
to taxable years beginning after December 31,
1933 ... " See 48 Stat. 683.
No pro-rata formula of any kind was included in
the act, and it was not applicable to the portions of
fiscal year taxpayers' incomes arising during fiscal years
beginning in 1933. Similar treatment has been given to
fiscal year taxpayers by the State of New York. See
Laws N.Y. 1922, C. 427 § 2; McKinney's Consolidated
Laws of New York, 59 § 371.
The procedure adopted by the Utah Legislature
therefore has well established historical antecedents. It
has the virtue promoting order, eliminating confusion
in administration of the tax and facilitating the computation of taxpayer income.
As these results are legitimate legislative ends, it is
submitted that the failure of the legislature to promote
absolute equality between fiscal and calendar year taxpayers is not of great importance.
All that is necessary is that all taxpayers that are
similarly situated be treated alike.

15

1t is not even necL•s..,;ary that all calendar year taxpay<'rs pay the same rah'. A graduated tax imposing a
different rate of tax upon different amounts of income
n•cei ved during the same calendar year is even pennissihle as long as the classification is reasonable. 8ee
State Buard of Ta:r Cum'rs. of Ind. v. Jackson, 283 U.S.
527, 51 8.Ct. 5±0, 75 L.Ed. 1248.

Jn that case an excise statute levying a tax on retail
stores was upheld. Another provision of the statute graduated the tax rate upward in the case of multiple-owned
stores. ln sustaining this differential rate the United
mates 8uprerne Court stated that there was sufficient
difference in the method of doing business to justify a
separate classification for the different groups.

rrl1e Supreme Court set forth additional guide lines
for determining proper tax classifications in the case of
TV elch v. Henry, 59 S.1Ct. 121; 305 U.S. 13±; 83 L.Ed. 87.
It was there stated:
"Any classification of taxation is permissible
which has reasonable relation to a legitimate end
of governmental action." 305 U.S. 144.
1

The Court continued:

"It is a common place that the equal protection clause does not require a state to maintain
rigid rules of equal taxation, to resort to close
distinctions, or to maintain precise scientific uniformitv. Possible differences in tax burdens, not
shown· to be substantial, or which are based on
discrimination not shown to be arbitrary or capricious, do not fall within the constitutional prohibition. Ibid. p. 145.
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Where, as in the present case, there is a kgitimat~
government purpose served by allowing fiscal year taxpayers to pay a different rate during the transitional
period when a rate increase takes effect, it is submitte<l
that such a legislative classification is reasonable and
constitutional.
POINT IV
RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ADOPTED
BY THIS COURT FURNISH SUPPORT FOR THE TAX COMMISSION'S POSITION HEREIN.

It must be noted that general rules of construction
apply with respect to judicial constructions of taxing
statutes. See 82C.J.S. Statutes §396. Thus it can be
definitively stated that a statute will not be construed
so as to defeat its evident object or purpose. Dif;nn v.
Bryan, 77 Utah 604, 299 P. 253.
The fundamental rule of statutory construction is
to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature. Inclu0trial Comniission of Utah v. Daly Mining
Co., 51 Utah 602, 172 P. 301; Norville v. State Tax Commission, 98 Utah 170, 97 P. 2d 937.
Where the language of a statute 1s plain and its
meaning clear, the court will not look beyond the language of the statute itself to ascertain its meaning. In
Re Stevens' Estate, 102 Utah 255, 130 P. 2d 85. However,
where the words of a statute are not explicit, the intention of the legislature will prevail over the literal sen~~
of its terms, and intention will be determined from tlw
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context, from tlw occa::-;ion and necessity for the law
according to what is con::-;onant with reason and good
discretion. lto1.rlf!J i:. Pu/Jlic Service Comm., 112 Utah
U li, 185 P. 2d 51-±; A'ame:-; v. Boa.rd of Cum' rs. of Cache
Co., 5S Utah ±95, 199 P. 970.
While the Tax l;o111111is::-;ion does not concede that
the words of the statute are unclear, yet the conflicting
pusi ti on::-; of the parties herein may compel the court to
conclude that time for the rate increase established by
Ch. 125, Laws of Vtah, 1965, is subject to two or more
constructions. In this event the Utah Supreme Court has
srt forth further guide lines which should be used in
interpreting this law.
Where an act is subject to two or more interpretations, the court should construe it to give effect to its
purpose. Ralph Child Construction Co. v. State Tax
Commission, 12 Utah 2d 53, 362 P. 2d 422; Driggs v.
Utah State Teachers Retirement Board, 105 Utah 417,
142 P. 2d 657.
Where part of a statute is subject to two constructions, the court will not construe a particular provision
of it so as to neutralize or modify other parts of the
same act if any other construction is possible. Construction should be consistent with the entire act. Miles v.
TV ells, 22 Utah 55, 61 P. 53±; See also W cstern Coal and
Mining Co. v. Hilbert, 63 Ariz. 171, 160 P. 2d 331.
The court has a duty to reconcile apparent inconsist(•neic•::-; \\'here possible, but where this cannot be done
it must ascertain and follow legislative intent if ascer-
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tainable. Spring Canyon Coal Co. v. Industriul Conimi0sion of Utah, 57 Utah 208, 193 P. 821.
The court will avoid a construction of a statute which
will result in confusion or uncertainty. M asich v. U.8. S.
R. & M. Co., 113 Utah 101, 191 P. 2d 612, app. dismissed,
335 U.S. 866, 69 S.iCt. 138, 93 L.Ed. ±11, Rehearing denied, 335 U.S. 905, 69 S.Ct. 405, 93 L.Ed.439.
Likewise the courts will grant every presumption in
favor of the constitutionality of a statute and will not
accord an unconstitutional interpretation to a legislative
enactment if any other interpretation would sustain the
act. Tintic Standard ill in. Co. v. Utah County, 80 Utah
491, 15 P. 2d 633; Howe v. State Tax COJnrnission, 10
Utah 2d 362, 353 P. 2d 468.
The purpose, subject matter, context, legislative
history and executive interpretation of a statute are aids
to construction which may indicate intent. Sinclair Refining Co. v. State Tax Cornrnission, 102 Utah 340, 130
P. 2d 663.
In attempting to ascertain legislative intent the
courts have the duty to look to the history of the legislation and the reasons for its passage. Board of Education
of Ogden City v. Hunter, 48 Utah 373, 159 P. 1019.
And where, as in the present case, the legislative
intent is established, and the only question is the effect
to be given to an alleged inconsistent provision which
does not conform to that policy and intent, such a pro-
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yision rn nugator:·. lVcst Beverage Co. u. llanse11, 98
Uah :3:3:.~, 9(i P. :Zd 1105.
1t is not proper to determine legi8lative intent from
isolatc>d or di8('0unected part8 of a 8tatute. W rat hall v.
Jol111suu, 8G Utah 50, JO P. 2d 755.

On('e the intention of the legislature is clear and
language of the 8tatutc defined, another rule of Utah
statutory con8truction urn8t be discussed. That is the
\rell established principle that the application of revenue
statutes will he strictly construed against the taxing
authority and in favor of the taxpayer. See W. F. Jensen
Caudy Co. v. State Tax Commission, 90 Utah 359, 61 P.
:2d 629.
rrhe reason for this rule is that the courts will not
burden the citizens of this state with taxes or restrict
their enjoyment of property where there is doubt that
such taxes or restrictions were intended by the legislature.
But the rule of strict construction should not be applied to defeat the legislative purpose or so as to lead
to impractical, unfair and unreasonable results. Norville
L'. State Tax Commission, 98 Utah 170, 97 P. 2d 937, 126
ALR 1318.
Where, as in the present case, the legislature has
determined that the 1965 income of all calendar year tax1myers should be taxed at increased rates, the rule of
:-;trict construction dot>8 not apply. This is not a case of
l'.\t<>rnling the plain meaning of a revenue act to tax
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something it is uncertain whethm· or not was intended to
be taxed by the legislature.
On the contrary, here it is certain that the legislature intended to subject calendar year income after January 1, 19G5, to increased tax rates. In this case an individual taxpayer is claiming exemption, because of a
technicality, from the general operation of a revenue act.
In such a circumstance a different rule of statutory construction comes into effect, namely that of strict construction of exemption statutes.
Here the taxpayer concedes that those taxpayers
filing after January 1, 1966, must pay the increased rate.
But it is contended that this increased rate is not imposed upon those few calendar year taxpayers who were
able to compute and file a tax return prior to January
1, 1966. Thus an exemption from the rate increase is attributed to the 1965 legislature.
But it is well established in this state that where a
statute purports to establish an exemption from the general application of a revenue law, such exemption provision is to be strictly construed against the one who
asserts the claimed exemption. Norville v. State Tax
Commission, 98 Utah 170, 97 P. 2d 937.
The presumption is that all exemptions intended to
be granted were granted in express terms and language
relied upon as creating the exemption must be so clear
as not to admit of reasonable controversy about ib
meaning. All doubts must be resolved against the exe111p1
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tion, and Pxemptiom; will not be aided by judicial interpretati011. Judge v. 8peuccr, 15 Utah 2-±2, -±8 P. 1097;
Porker v. (Juinn, 23 Utah 332, (jJ P. 961; Elks v. Groes{;cck, +o Utah 1, 120. 192; N orvillc v. State Tax Commission, ~)8 Utah 170, 97 P. 2d 937.

Applying these rules, it is submitted that the statutes do not specifically authorize an exemption for the
plaintiff herein. In fact, the only authority for plaintiff's
position herein is founded on a negative inference which
may render the statute discriminatory and invalid. Clearly, this is not :sufficient to grant plaintiff the relief
sought. Therefore, the Court should find that all calPndar year taxpayers must pay the increased income
tax rates as intended by the 1965 Utah Legislature.
POINT V
WHERE AN INCOME TAX LIABILITY IS CLEARLY
ESTABLISHED BY STATUTE, THE STATUTE WILL PREVAIL OVER AN ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATION
THEREOF.

It may be contended that the State Tax Commission
has accepted isolated income tax returns filed with it
during the year 1965 and accorded lower rates to such
returns. In some instances, the filing of fractional or part
year returns is allowed by the statute when a calendar
year, for some reason, is terminated. In some cases where
such returns have been filed, it is possible that the Commission may have accorded lower rates to them.

However, all returns filed with the Commission are
~ubjPct to audit and in the event the rate increase or the
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rate upon which such returns are based is not properly
reflected in them, a defieiency accessment can be filed
which will more accurately reflect the income due frorn
those returns.
The Commission has adopted this procedure in many
instances and has been willing to take any returns submitted to it without initial questioning as to their propriety or legality. After such returns are reviewed by
the 1Cornrnission's auditing division, it is the policy to
send out deficiency assessments if the returns are not
properly computed or paid.
It is here sought to bind the Commission to the
treatment given to certain isolated returns and to determine that such treatment, even though erroneous should
be given to all returns regardless of when filed and regardless of what the correct rates governing their filing
should be.
It is well established in this State that governmental
agencies cannot deprive the courts of their judicial fun~
tion, nor can the agencies extend the operation of a
statute by administrative regulation. Western Lea.tlier
& Finding Company v. State Tax Commission, 87 Utah
227, 48 Pac. 2d 526.

The Commission is only empowered to make rules
and regulations in conformity with the statutes and
court decisions of the State of Utah. The legislative
power, which appellant seeks here to attribute to th('
State Tax Commission, is more properly assigned !11
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of thl' ~tate of Utah by the L~tah Con~titution. Ftah Constitution Article YI, Section I. The
L(•gislatur<~ is not pern1ittt>d to abdicate or transfer to
otht•rs the ecsential lt>gislative function with ·which it
is vested, and the Tax Commission has no desire to
as:s1m1<• this function. In the ease of In Re Jones' Estate,
99 Utah ;i{;), 10-t P. 2d 19-±1, this Court held that a stipulation lwtm,·en the Attorney General for the State of
nah and the attorney for a taxpayer did not bind the
Statt· 'l1ax Commission, "where a statute clearly and unau1bignously fixes a tax liability." It was held that the
statute was controlling on all of the parties subject to the
tax in that case regardless of any rules or interpretation
by the r:L'ax Commission.
Legislatun~

l t is well established that an interpretation or regulation by a State administrative agency, such as the
State Tax Commission, is only an administrative opinion
as to what the statute under construction means. This
is the holding of the Utah Supreme Court in the case of
Utah Jiotcl Co. v. Industrial Comrnission, 107 Utah 2±,
151 P. 2d ±67. The Court there stated:

". . . [T]he administrative tribunal may,
hy adopting a given regulation, only purport to
interpret what the legislature meant by its statutory language. Such a regulation is nothing but
an administrative opinion as to what the statute
means.
"From the statements of the case in the briefs
of counsel, it is clear that the so-called regulation
under eonstruction in this case is nothing more
than an initial guess by the administrative tri-
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bunal as to what the statute ... means ... All
administrative interpretation out of harrnonv and
contrary to the <'XlH'('SS provisions of a statut('
cannot be given weight. To do so would in effect
amend the statute. Construction may not be suhstituted for legislation." 107 Utah 31.
This Court also held in the case of Lewis v. Utah
State Tax Cornniission, 118 t'tah 72, 218 P. 2d 1074, that:
"An erroneous construction of a statute made
by an administrative body is not binding upon
this Court."
1

The Tax Commission herein does not concede that it
has erroneously construed the statute. It is submitted
that in the few isolated cases wherein a tentative approval may have been given to the filing of a 1965 income
tax return based upon the lower rates exisiting prior
to H.B. No. 81 that such approval is only tentative. rrhe
initial treatment to be given to a return is subject to
audit by the Commission's auditing division and review
by the quasi - judicial Tax Commission itself.
In no sense is the treatment which has been given
such returns to be considered final. However, even if
the ·Court does determine that the Commission has accorded treatment to some early returns which is inconsistent with the position that it now advocates shoulcl
properly control, it is submitted that the interpretation
of the Commission in either event cannot control the
tax rate which should apply to said returns. Utah ca~c
law is unanimously in accord that the tax rate to be paid
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tliat rate \\'hieh is due and payable under applicable
l'tah statutes as determined by the court8.

i~;

CONCLUSION
'I1he 'rax Commission respectfully submits the Legislature intended the increased rates provided by H.B. No.
tll to apply to all income for taxable years commencing
on or after January 1, l!:l65. To the extent that other
language of thi8 statute is inconsistent with this result,
it should be di~:ffegarded. The judgment of the lower
Court should be rever:::;ed in part to reflect such a result.
Respectfully submitted,
F. BUR.TON HOvV ARD
Special Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Appellant
336 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah

